CHINA:
The Reversal of Socialism



How the "Gang of Four" Betrayed the Left During the Cultural Revolution

A Progressive Labor Party Pamphlet 25¢

Mao: The Two Sides of His Life

CHALLENGE / *September 23, 1976*

Chairman Mao Tse Tung of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) died Thursday morning. He was one of the outstanding figures of the 20th century and of the international communist movement. No one should slight his historical influence. Mao's life contained and illustrated the principle contradictions of the 20th century and throughout the history of the international communist movement—the struggle between the line of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and the line of accommodation and opportunism-revisionism.

AT THE AGE OF 82, HE SUCCUMBED TO illness. Previously, at the age of 74, he had succumbed to the line of accommodating to imperialism and capitalism. The latter was a greater tragedy, because, throughout this 50-year career as a revolutionist, Mao had made outstanding contributions to the cause of revolutionary communism.

—Mao was the first to organize peasants on a massive scale, directly under the banners of revolutionary communism. The peasant soviets formed under his leadership involved millions in Hunan-Kiangsi.And they successfully fought hundreds of thousands of reactionary troops for 7 years. (1927-1934).

—Mao personally led the epic Long March from South China to Inner-Mongolia, an outstanding achievement in revolutionary warfare.

—These years Mao lent a great deal to the literature of revolutionary Marxism. His **Report on Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,** contains his famous dictum: "A revolution is not a dinner party or writing an essay, painting a picture or doing embroidery. It cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind and courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence, by which one class overthrows another". **On Practice, On Contradiction** are two essays which clearly set forth the Marxist theory of dialectics. **On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, Combat Liberalism, Reform Our Study, Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing, Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,** are five essays essential for understanding the nature of internal contradiction within a communist party. He also wrote some useful texts on guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, as a revolutionary Marxist, Mao was weak on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. (This is what constitutes the most profound distinction between the Marxist and the ordinary petit-bourgeoise". — Lenin.)

—In 1937, Mao disbanded the Soviets and the Red Army in order to reach an accommodation with Chiang Kai-Shek.

—In 1940, he wrote **On New Democracy,** which completely muddled the Leninist theory of the state and in essence discarded the dictatorship of the proletariat. This work became the fundamental text of the Chinese Communist Party for 30 years.

—In 1945, he was willing to negotiate the entrance of communists into a coalition government with Chiang Kai-Shek (in other words participate in a bourgeois dictatorship: this would have been a complete betrayal of Marxism-Leninism). Luckily Chiang would not agree to the terms.

—In 1949, on the eve of the triumph of the revolution, Mao wrote **On the Peoples' Democratic Dictatorship,** which converted the Leninist dictatorship of the proletariat into a so-called people's dictatorship which included the petit bourgeoisie. In this work Mao promised to "protect business" and declared that the national bourgeoisie, the class enemy of all workers, "is still standing along side us." These were to be the unfortunate policies of People's China.

—An instructive contrast between Lenin and the Bolsheviks and Mao and the CCP is that as the revolution approached in Russia, Lenin became sharper and more uncomproming on the dictatorship of the proletariat. **The State and Revolution** and **The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky,** his two sharpest expositions of this concept, were written on the eve of and just after, respectively, of the Bolshevik revolution. Mao, on the other hand, become more vague and muddled about the dictatorship of the proletariat as the Chinese Revolution approached. His famous and often quoted **Report to the Second Session of the 7th Central Committee** issued on the eve of the revolution which discussed in detail the outlook of the Peoples Rep. of China, did not even once mention the dictatorship of the proletariat in 14 pages, only saying it was necessary to regulate capital.

Nevertheless, even in his later years, Mao continued to make important contributions to the cause of the international working class.

1. He led the Communist Party of China to heroic victory over Japanese fascism (see current PL Magazine).

2. Unlike the traitors Thorez and Togliatti, Mao refused to disband the Red Army in exchange for



Mao's writings while he was a communist inspired revolutionnary struggles throughout the world

some cabinet post in a post-war coalition government.

3. He directed the victory of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese volunteers in the Korean war, two devastating blows against U.S. imperialism, that began its current decline.

4. Mao gave crucial support to key mass movements among China's workers and peasants, such as the People's Commune.

5. Mao was often an unrelenting critic of bourgeoisie art and literature. Although the CCP under his leadership produced only wooden caricatures of proletarian art, he understood the importance of communist culture in opposition to all bourgeois culture, more clearly than Lenin and Stalin.

6. Mao opposed Krushchev revisionism:

in 1963-1965, under his leadership, the CCP wrote some brilliant exposes of revisionism: **The Proletarian Revolution and Krushchev Revisionism, More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us, Two Different Lines, on the Question of War and Peace, On Krushchev Phony Communism,** by Mao himself, were the four best and easily rank among the most important Marxist-Leninist documents.

Yet the same time Mao bought the Krushchev line on nationalism. Both Mao and Krushchev abandoned proletarian internationalism simultaneously. They only differed on which bourgeois nationalists to support. Krushchev preferred Nehru while Mao preferred Sukarno.

There are two aspects to the Sino-Soviet dispute, on the one hand there was the staunch defense of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, on the other hand, there was anti-Soviet Chinese nationalism pure and simple. When the Cultural Revolution was defeated by 1968 (see PLP pamphlet **Road to Revolution III** for more details on this), the aspects of Chinese nationalism predominated and the defense of the principles of Marxism-Leninism against Soviet Revisionism was forgotten.

At that point, the weaknesses that had been secondary in a revolutionary career became primary. The last eight years were a disgraceful finish for the career of a revolutionary. Some of the worst scums of the world made the journey to Peking to shake hands and be photographed with Mao. There were those disgusting pictures of Mao greeting Nixon, Ford and Kissinger; emperor Haile Selassie, Bandanardike of Sri Lanka with the blood of 40,000 revolutionaries dripping from her hands; the fascist dictator of the Phillipines, Sudan, Pakistan, Thailand, Burma and elsewhere; decrepit royalty from Nepal, Iran, Cambodia, an elsewhere; the U.S. supported dictatorship of Pinochet; slimy capitalist politicians from all the major powers; the open support of facists.

So we see both sides of Mao. And we won't participate in the semi-religious cultism that started ten years before his death and will now undoubtedly intensify. The working class doesn't need religion of any type.

Yet these unfavorable developments have to be looked at as a process, and Mao's life must be understood as a contradiction. We have to learn from the positive contributions of Mao and study his revolutionary writings and deeds, just as we have to learn from his mistakes and see how ideological weaknesses on the dictatorship of the proletariat, internationalism, lead to treachery and betrayal.

Finally we have to understand that a man can only influence history as Mao did in conjunction with a mass movement. His strengths and weaknesses are, in the final analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of the mass movement of tens of millions—the international communist movement. Thus by understanding Mao's strengths we can draw inspirations; in understanding his weaknesses we can see our duties.

China: The Reversal of Socialism

Ten years ago this fall, millions of Chinese students and workers were joining the Red Guard groups to spread the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution throughout China. The Red Guards attacked the leaders of the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party for adopting policies which were leading China back towards capitalism. As a result of monumental struggles, the Red Guards were able to develop and to implement new policies. Like the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution, the Cultural Revoultion greatly expanded our understanding of how socialist society actually works

THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP OF CHINA claims to be communist; if they were communists, then they would be in the vanguard of the struggles to extend the socialist policies introduced in the Cultural Revolution. But for the last five years the leaders of the Chinese "Communist" Party have been dismantling the gains of the Cultural Revolution as fast as they could; sometimes they ran into massive resistance, so they had to back-peddle a bit, but on the whole they have been successful in smashing the left's opposition to attacks on the Cultural Revolution. These leaders are revisionists; that is, they may think of themselves as socialists, but actually they are restoring capitalism to China. The new leadership under Hua Kuo-feng is speedily restoring the pro-capitalist policies of the pre-Cultural Revolution days.

This week, we will look at the gains won in the Cultural Revolution and how they are being reversed in the areas of culture, education, and health. Next article we will look at the factories, the fields, and the government offices.

Before the Cultural Revolution, education in China was basically capitalist in character: most children from worker and peasant families only got the rudiments of education, while the children of the bureaucrats and old capitalist families competed heatedly for the prestigious positions reserved for university graduates. The Red Guards changed all that. There was less emphasis on competitive exams, and more emphasis on collective learning, with the students who learn faster helping the slower ones. Teachers and professors were no longer treated like mini-gods, but comrades to help in the learning process. Courses were made more relevant to the needs of the Chinese masses; students integrated their studies with work in factories and fields. Political activists and people from worker or peasant backgrounds were given priority in admissions to university and high school. Enrollment was expanded and the course of studies shortened by several years so that education would no longer be the preserve of a small elite.

The educational reforms are slowly being whittled away under the guise of restoring "quality" to education (the same excuse used here for racist cutbacks like eliminating open admissions). The old competitive "high academic standards" admissions procedure for universities is coming back in place of consultation with the masses. There have been some sharp attacks recently on the "open air universities" set up in factories and fields to extend education to many more people (often by correspondence courses); instead of upgrading these universities, the new leadership wants to restrict or eliminate them. In the classroom, old-style exams are returning and politics are being banished in place of more "academic" subjects.

The same process is at work in health. There is little mention now of the "barefoot doctors"; there are reports that some officials openly ridicule them. Before the Cultural Revolution, there were a few fancy hospitals and highly trained doctors in the cities, but most people never got any medical attention. The "barefoot doctors" were a vast corps of peasants and students who brought some elementary health care to the hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants. The plan, now scuttled in the name of "quality" (for the few), was to continually upgrade the training of the barefoot doctors and to supplement them with medical stations scattered throughout the countryside.

There is no question that bourgeois culture was dominant in pre-Cultural Revolution China. The old operas (or new ones in their style) dominated, glorifying individualism, the ruling class, material wealth, and escapism or passivity in the face of oppression. The attempts to create communist culture during the Cultural Revolution were seriously hampered by the absurd personality cult around Chairman Mao; a typical scene would show a peasant defying a winter storm bare-chested warmed by "Mao Tse-tung thought." Plus there was the incredible egotism of Chiang Ching (Mao's widow, denounced as a traitor by the new rulers), who ruled her cultural empire with an iron hand; she forced all of China to listen to her eight "model operas" (nothing else could be performed) for almost two years. But even the limited gains of the

Cultural Revolution are now being washed away: already, old-style operas are being performec informally in Peking. (To be continued).

China: Part II

Last week, we saw how the Cultural Revolution in China expanded our understanding of how socialist society actually works in the areas of culture, education and health. We also saw that the gains of the Cultural Revolution are being systematically reversed by the revisionists (capitalists who call themselves socialists) who rule China today. This week, we will look at the advances made in the factories, the fields and the government offices, and how these advances are being replaced by policies which restore capitalism.

Before the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, Chinese industry was shot through and through with capitalist practices like piece-rate wage systems, bonuses for hard work, and strongly hierarchial management. In great struggles, the workers threw out this system which encouraged individualism, competition among the workers, and striving for material wealth above all else. They got rid of the bonuses and sharply reduced the difference in wages between unskilled and skilled, worker and manager. In place of practices which encouraged each worker to look out for himself alone, they instituted collective co-operation to make work safer, more pleasant, and more efficient.

The workers drastically reduced the management bureaucracy; decisions were made by the people whom the decisions affected, rather than by some far-off bureaucrat. The management was integrated with the production workers. Managers were chosen by the workers, subject to recall

Mass meeting during the Cultural Revolution to denounce capitalist–roaders

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anytime the workers wanted; managers worked on the production line several days a week, and the workers met often to discuss management decisions.

In the last five years, every one of these policies has been systematically undermined. The old technocratic, haughty managers have been restored to power in the factories; workers' committees no longer set policy or choose the managers. The old 30-grade wage scale for party cadres has been restored. The Communist Party, which should be leading the struggle for "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need," now pays its top leaders 404 yuan per month, while a grade 30 cadre starts at 20 yuan (and that's not counting the "expense accounts" the leaders get). China is now importing tens of millions of dollars worth of luxuries (like Cuban cigars and Swiss watches) for sale to the big shots at 100 per cent markup. The new party leadership under Hua Kuo-feng is openly discussing a return to bonuses, to piece-rate wages. Not that the so-called "radicals" (Chiang Ching and friends, or the "four pests," as they are now referred to) were much better: they pushed for longer work hours at the same pay, which led to major revolts like the one in the city of Hangchow in the summer of 1975.

It is the same story in the countryside: despite opposition, capitalist policies are being restored. The Cultural Revolution emphasized the move away from private plots and individual handicrafts; instead of these petty capitalist ways of increasing income, the Red Guards stressed small-scale industry run by the commune. These small-scale workshops, built by local efforts, spread the benefits of industrialization throughout China, instead of concentrating on a few big show-piece projects. Building up industry in the countryside instead of the big cities also helped break down the division between worker and peasant, between city and country. Now, however, private plots are coming back in a big way; the new 1975 constitution even guarntees the "right" to private plots (which is almost as absurd as the "right" to exploit workers!). In place of the Cultural Revolution policy of encouraging local fertilizer plants, the revisionists are importing big plants from abroad—already, there are eight from the U.S. (at $35 million each) with more to come.

Throughout Chinese society, the government bureaucrats are reasserting control and getting rid of anything that would give the masses decision-making power. Both Marx and Lenin stressed that socialism was a period when the workers would take direct control over society and abolish the state; for example, the police would be replaced by a workers' militia, the factory management by workers' committees. The communes set up in Shanghai and other cities during the Cultural Revolution were a big step in this direction, but these communes were smashed. The commune were replaced by "revolutionary three-in-one committees," where the representatives of the workers and peasants were supposed to share power with the old cadres and the army; now, the cadres pretty much run things by themselves.

When the Chinese Communist Party was a revolutionary party, it used to organize campaigns where the masses of workers and peasants were asked to evaluate the party and its cadres—to say what had been done wrong and what right, to say where things should go next. Differences in the Party or among the masses were openly discussed to some extent (everyone had to pay homage to the infallibility"of Mao Tse-tung). During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards used this method of mass criticism to launch their struggle for seizing state power from the revisionists. Now, political disputes are confined to a few top leaders with the masses brought in only as cheerleaders. The disputes are carried out in incredibly obscure language so that it is almost impssible to figure out what is actually going on.

As China "changes color" from socialist to capitalist, there are many workers and peasants who organise local struggles to oppose the move to the right. These struggles are isolated from each other and they are not likely to succeed unless a new communist party can emerge to co-ordinate and lead the fight for state power. Right now, the revisionists have a strong hold on China and they accelerate the move towards capitalism.

Chilean torturer mourns Mao...

His Excellency Mr. Hua Kuo-feng,
Premier of the State Council,
First Vice-Chairman of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party
of China,
Peking

Please allow me, on behalf of the Chilean people and Government and in my own name, to express to Your Excellency our sincere condolences on the unfortunate passing away of Mao Tsetung, an eminent statesman.

The deceased leader who projected the road to prosperity and development for your country has left an illustrious image in the history of humanity. Your Excellency, please accept the feelings of my highest consideration.

General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago, Chile, September 9, 1976

Communists' struggle above board

Fascist methods expose Hua Kuo-Feng

THE WORKER November 19, 1976

Mao Tse-Tung once warned us, at the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that the Communist Party of China had to be vigilant against revisionism, because, he said, it is possible for a Party to become fascist almost overnight. While being confused and confusing on many other matters, he couldn't have been more right on this one. Ask his wife.

Since the crushing of the GPCR with Mao's help China has been ruled by fascism. We've already explained our views on Mao, his wife, and her cohorts. They were "centrists" who tried to straddle the class struggle and are now, with the defeat of the left, being cleaned out by the right.

Mrs. Mao and Co. will never be heard from (unless her crowd stages a counter-coup). She will never get a trial. Most likely she won't even be seen again. From one end of the world to the other this is thought to be "normal". It is an outrage! It is fascist! It has nothing to do with Communism; with respect for the views of workers, respect for their right to consider and to decide.

Instead we get these obscene parades pushed along by the army (the one James Schlesinger is lining up to serve U.S. imperialism in a future war with the Russian imperialists). The paraders have to carry signs saying X is evil, when yesterday the same paraders were carrying signs saying X was good.

Compare this brutal cynicism to Bolshevik practice. Following the revolution, certain "socialist" parties engaged in sabotage against Lenin's Party. They were arrested and put on trial; the first of what the class enemy called "show trials". When foreign friends of the defendants complained of the arrests, they were invited to attend the trials and even allowed to help with the defence. But, Lenin warned, the guilty will be executed. The accused could stand up and explain themselves. This gave the masses confidence in their government.

At the death of Lenin in 1924 Trotsky made a move to takeover and was blocked but he was allowed to squirm and struggle for another two years and workers and Party members examined and repudiated his rotten "programme". Stalin, among others, guaranteed his right to struggle.

When the Trotskyites abandoned open "comradely" tactics and began to take the road of disruption and sabotage they too were arrested—AND PUT ON TRIAL. Workers' delegations and journalists from all over the world attended the trials. This was a triumph for Communist ideology—for the concept of relying on the working class.

The capitalists of the world hated those trials and have howled about them ever since, whereas, today, they passively repeat as fact little pre-fabricated tidbits thrown to them by the fascist generals of China.

This has been a galling question for years. The Chinese Party was never exemplary on the treatment of oppositionists. Yet, paradoxically, pipe-sucking liberals and professional "experts" have been lecturing us about Mao's more "open", methods of handling differences. Baloney! Liu Shao-chi we were told was a monster (after nearly 30 years of leadership). Liu was never permitted to answer a single charge. Liu Piao was a Russian agent and out to kill Mao. Not a peep from Liu. Teng Tsiao-ping was an ornery something or other. No chance to reply for Teng. Now it's Mrs. Mao who (according to straight faced Ross Munro in the Globe and Mail) tried to kill Mao, as he lay dying! Really, comrades, as he was dying? What's the rush? This is a pack of gangsters, and yet some act as though it is only political "line" that's involved.

We shouldn't be vague about this at all. A Party that won't take its case to the masses, that won't hear evidence or argument, especially from the most "prominent figures, may as well fold up its pretensions to Leninist principles and study the thought of the Godfather.

Who Are the 'Four Dogs'?

CHALLENGE *November 18, 1976*

For the last month, there has been a widespread campaign in China against four so-called "radicals." The CHALLENGE editorial last week explained why the "moderates" won out over the "radicals"; this week we will discuss who are the "radicals" and what is their program.

THE FOUR "RADICALS" WERE HIGH-level members of the "Communist" Party of China who had risen to powerful positions because of their role in the Cultural Revolution. Wang Hung-wen, who had been a low-level official at the Numer 17 Cotton Mill in Shanghai, became second deputy chairman of the Party; Yao Wen-yuan, who had been a journalist in Shanghai, took charge of all the media in China; Chang Chun-chiao, who had been Director of Propaganda in Shanghai, became secretary-general of the Party and the first deputy Prime Minister; Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, who had been an author and a director, was in charge of all cultural affairs. In other words, the four rose from relative obscurity only ten years ago to become among the most powerful officials in all of China.

In order to understand why the four rose so fast that some Chinese called them "helicopters" (they go straight up), we have to look at the role that the four played in the Cultural Revolution. The four are called "radicals" in the U.S. press because they were supposedly leftists during the Cultural Revolution, especially in Shanghai, where most of them are from. Actually these so-called "radicals" were the main mis-leaders of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai; they first sold out and then crushed the real left, who were called the ultra-left.

The Cultural Revolution in China was a mass revolt against the officials and the policies which were taking China down the road towards restoration of capitalism. One of the major incidents that started the Cultural Revolution was the criticism of a play which, in a veiled way, advocated policies similar to those Khrushchev was using to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R.: giving power to the bureaucrats instead of the workers, encouraging the pursuit of individual material advantage instead of collective responsibility, etc. Yao Wen-yuan, Chang Chun-chiao, and Chiang Ching were the people who criticized this play in 1965; they became three of the five members of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group.

By the summer of 1966, the students in Peking were in mass revolt against "those people in power taking the capitalist road"; open fighting had broken out among the members of the Central Committee. At this time, Mao and the Cultural Revolution Group were leading the attack on the revisionists; Mao encouraged the students to form Red Guard groups to criticize capitalist-roaders. But by the fall of 1966, the Cultural Revolution had taken a turn that Mao had not expected: the workers became involved! The Cultural Revolution Group sent a telegram to workers in Shanghai, the main center of working-class revolt, saying, "As workers, your main job is to work. Joining in the Revolution is only secondary. You must therefore go back to work." (Quoted from **Shanghai Journal**, By Neale Hunter, an Australian Maoist who lived in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution).

The Cultural Revolution in Shanghai became more and more militant; workers and students united to throw out the bureaucratic officials and managers. In December 1966, these capitalist-roaders walked off their jobs—they figured that the workers could never run things by themselves, that production would halt and the city become a mess, so the workers would have to beg the bureaucrats to come back and run things. For a while, it looked like the bureaucrats might win: production halted, the city was tied up, and many people were fooled into thinking that the only way to straighten things up was by restoring the old right-wing officials. The workers and students were inexperienced at political struggle, plus they did not have any party to lead them, so they bickered and fought with each other instead of seizing control of the city government, of the factories, of the newspapers, of the schools, etc.

By January 1967, the workers and students had, however, seized control of Shanghai. They were restructuring society on the principles of the Paris Commune; they were forming a Shanghai Commune. The big government bureaucracies were disbanded; wherever possible, the organized masses took over government functions—for instance, an armed Workers' Militia took over the job of the police. The top-heavy factory management structure was thrown out; now, small committees of workers (elected by the workers, paid the same as the workers, subject to instant recall) performed what management functions were necessary. These workers on the management committees also worked on the line at least part of the time. Similar changes were made in the schools to eliminate the system of individual competition for the highest marks and to make learning a collective process in which the teacher is not an almighty boss but the

leader of a group.

Mao was scared—he wanted a few right-wing officials thrown out, but not a revolution! Just when it looked like the workers might be able to consolidate their victory in Shanghai and extend it to all China, in stepped Chang Chun-chiao, the "radical." Chang and his friends made sure that the leadership of the Commune stayed in their hands, not in the hands of the rank-and-file. When things calmed down a bit, then Chang rushed to smash the Commune and bring back the old officials. After consulting with Mao, Chang made a two-hour speech on Shanghai television in February, 1967 "explaining" why it was necessary to bring the capitalist-roaders back into power. Mao ordered the army to intervene if necessary, but Chang was slick enough to restore (capitalist) order without them. Even a Maoist apologist like Victor Nee has to admit (in **China's Uninterrupted Revolution**) that Chang, Yao, and company basically restored the old officials whom the workers had thrown out. Only one percent of the officials—the most hard-core right-wingers—were kept out.

Chang Chun-chiao and friends managed to smash the left in Shanghai in spring, 1967. Throughout the rest of the country, there was a great upsurge by the left in the summer of 1967. This was the high point of the Cultural Revolution: millions of "ultra-leftists" denounced the "red capitalist class" which ruled China, called for a new communist party, and fought the army's attempts to restore the old officials. In **PL** magazine (August, 1972), there is an excellent article by one of these ultra-left groups, the Sheng wu-lien. As Nee points out, this high wave of the Cultural Revolution hardly touched Shanghai. The rest of the country was on the brink of civil war and armed revolution, but Shanghai was relatively peaceful. Chang and his friends had bought off the leaders of the workers' movement and then smashed the rank-and-file movement.

That's why Chang and friends rose to top leadership positions: they showed that radical-sounding speeches, sophisticated political maneuvering, and buying off a few leaders was the most efficient way to stop workers' revolution. The "moderates" had to use the army to crush the workers' movement in open warfare—that caused a lot of destruction and bitterness. Chang presented a "radical" image and was able to keep things under control; production never stopped in Shanghai in the summer of 1967. Chang and the other so-called "Shanghai radicals" believe in the classic liberal path for stopping revolution: give out a few reforms, buy off a few leaders, and crush the mass movement. The so-called "moderates" would rather use the big stick on the workers; they want to

Shanghai poster attaching the 'gang of four' (Nov. 76)

return to the openly pro-capitalist policies of the period before the Cultural Revolution. The recent victory of the "moderates" means that even the limited victories won in the Cultural Revolution will be reversed.

The "radicals" and "moderates" agree on what they want for China: a technocratic fake "socialism" where the workers have no say in the running of society. **Neither** group is the real left: the real left is the millions of "ultra-leftists" from the Cultural Revolution, people who are still active in rank-and-file struggles throughout China (struggles which are usually crushed). The differences between the "radicals" and the "moderates" are mainly over who is going to be the new bosses. Chou En-lai and Mao were trying to bring the two groups together; if they had lived, they would probably have succeeded. After Chou died, the old conflict between "radicals" and "moderates" flared up again. Pretty soon, the hatred got so intense that each group began to plot to overthrow the other.

After Mao died, the "moderates" saw their chance; their camp had been strengthened by the fears among China's new rulers that the campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping might turn into another Cultural Revolution (something neither "radicals" nor "moderates" wanted). The "moderates" have now seized power. Nobody much defended the "radicals": the real leftists aren't interested in those opportunist liberals, and many other people were turned off by Chiang Ching's extreme sectarianism. Most of China's new rulers are so scared by their memories of the Cultural Revolution that they are afraid to try liberal reforms

There is no reason for us to mourn the defeat of the "radicals," just like there is no reason for us to be sorry when liberals lose to conservatives in this country. The only way that workers can seize power is by breaking with both liberals and conservatives and building a communist party to make a socialist revolution. The ultra-left in the Cultural Revolution called for a new communist party in China; it seems highly unlikely that the leftist elements still active in China will be able in the near future to unite their small-scale struggles into a communist party. While the class struggle will continue in China, the trend for the near future is for more movement to the right as China's new bosses consolidate their power.

Red guards hated Hua...

Hua Kuo-feng, the fascist boss of China, has been erroneously called a "centrist" or "moderate", and some describe him as an unknown.

Winner? Hua Kuo-feng holds key positions as leader of Government, Army and party

But the Red Guards of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the mid-sixties knew him well ... and hated him. We can see what the revolutionaries thought of Hua in the following quotes taken from a Red Guard document titled, "Whither China?"

The "Red" capitalist class gained an almost overwhelming ascendancy in February and March (1967). The property (of means of production) and power were wrested away from the hands of the revolutionary people and returned to the bureaucrats. In early spring, in February, Lung Shu-chin, Liu Tzu-yun, Chang Po-shen, Hua Kuo-feng, and bureaucrats throughout the country and their agents at the Center, wielded unlimited power. It was their heyday, while the power of the revolutionary people dropped to zero. Moreover, large numbers of revolutionary people were thrown into prison by the state organs — public security, procuracy, and judicial organs — controlled by the capitalist class.

For a short time, the cities were in a state of "armed mass dictatorship." The power in most of the industries, commerce, communications, and urban administration was again taken away from Chang Po-shen, Hua Kuo-feng, Lung Shu-chin, Liu Tzu-yun and their like and put into the hands of the revolutionary people. Never before had the revolutionary people appeared on the stage of history in the role of masters of world history as they did in August. Primary students voluntarily did the work of communications and security. Their brave gestures in directing traffic, and the pride with which "Storm Over Hsiang River," "Red Middle Committee" and other mass organizations directly exercised some of the financial-economic powers, left an unforgettable impression with he people.

China's Foreign Policy:

Alliance with U.S. Imperialism

In spite of all the turmoil in China during the last year, China's foreign policy hasn't changed very much. The new leadership is carrying on the reactionary policies laid down by Mao and the recently purged "gang of four."

THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP JUSTIFIES their support for counter-revolution with the ridiculous theory that the world is divided into three "camps." The "first world" is said to be the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the two superpowers. Then comes the "second world," which includes Europe, Japan, Canada, etc. Finally there is the "third world," which includes everybody else. Each of the superpowers is said to be seeking "hegemony" over the whole world; the Chinese leaders call on the "second world" to unite with the "third world" in opposing "hegemonism."

This theory that the world is divided into three camps overlooks the main factor that divides the world: the division into **classes**. In every nation in the world today, the basic division is between the capitalist ruling class and the working class (and its allies: the peasantry, students, etc.). As communists, our "foreign policy" is to encourage the overthrow of the ruling class in every country. We do not support any ruling class anywhere, no matter what the phony excuse ("opposing hegemonism," "supporting national liberation," or whatever). The class struggle is world-wide; only by giving as much support as we can to revolutionaries in other countries can we strengthen the revolutionary movement in our country.

The Chinese leadership has used the theory of "three worlds" to justify support for fascist regimes around the world; any "third world" ruling class that supports "unity of the third world" and opposes "the superpowers' drive for hegemony" qualifies for Chinese aid. In 1971, the Chinese supported the Bandaranaike regime in Ceylon, sending arms to crush the uprising led by students and agricultural workers. In 1973, when General Pinochet overthrew Allende in Chile, the Chinese Embassy locked its doors in the face of leftists seeking refuge from the fascist terror; last year, the Chinese offered Pinochet a loan of $50 million, when even the liberal governments of Europe were scared that open support for the butcher Pinochet would provoke strikes in Europe. **Peking Review** sings the praises of the brutal Marcos regime in the

Nixon has a 'friendly chat' with Hua Kuo-feng -- birds of a feather flock together

Shanghai workers won't be stopped

This month is the tenth anniversary of the great revolutionary upsurge in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution. It was a violent upheaval of the workers of that city directed against the Maoist system of "new democracy" and crowned with the declaration of the Shanghai Commune, patterned on the Paris Commune of 1871. It was described in one declaration as a state form "more in keeping with the socialist economic base."

But Mao crushed the Shanghai Commune, replacing with a "municipal revolutionary committee" packed with "rehabilitated" party cadres and led by two of Mao's henchmen, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan. These two are half of the famous "Gang of Four", the latest "handful in power" to take the rap for capitalism in China. There was speculation that the workers of Shanghai might rise to save them, but bitter memories of their sellout in 1967 prevailed.

The Shanghai Commune's history is difficult to trace, because today's Chinese regime has had it removed from all accounts. Recent visitors to China have had their questions answered with a stony silence. A copy of the Feb. 6, 1967 issue of the major Shanghai daily newspaper **Wen hui pao**, which published the declaration of the Commune, is unavailable anywhere in the country.

But a Commune surely existed, and there are enough accounts by participants, journalists, Chinese newspapers and radio broadcasts that we can tell at least a sketchy story of this great episode in communist history.

Phillipines. The wife and the sister of the Shah of Iran are frequent visitors to Peking; a high-level delegation was recently sent from China to help the Shah celebrate the founding of the murderous Pahlevi Dynasty.

Not content with supporting "third world" fascists, the Chinese leaders have been cozying up to the capitalists in the "second world" (Europe, Japan, Canada). The Chinese press praises the European Common Market as an example of how the "second world" should "unite to oppose the superpowers"—without mentioning the struggles of European workers for higher pay, better conditions, and an end to racist discrimination against foreign workers. The Chinese leaders invite a stream of European prime ministers to Peking—not to discuss the need for socialist revolution in Europe, but to learn from the European ruling class how to make China into a junior imperialist power.

It turns out the Chinese rulers don't even oppose both of the two superpowers. Because U.S. imperialism is on the decline and Soviet imperialism on the rise, Mao decided to ally with U.S. imperialism to oppose the "main danger," the U.S.S.R. The U.S. ruling class eagerly accepted this valuable new ally; politicians, journalists, and academics all stream over to China these days and come back with glowing descriptions (even "Dear Abby" got in on the act!). Each week, Peking Review writes about how wonderful NATO is; the Chinese news agency on November 12 had an article greeting "The Committee on the Present Danger," formed by hard-line anti-communists to "alert the American people to the Soviet Danger" (it includes the wonderful people who brought you the war in Vietnam: Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, etc.).

Even the staunchest supporters of the Chinese revisionists are finding it hard to defend China's alliance with U.S. imperialism. Enver Hoxha, leader of the Albania Party of Labor recently called for opposition to both U.S. and Soviet imperialism; he also implicitly attacked the Chinese "three worlds" theory by saying that the world is divided into only two camps: the socialist countries and the bourgeois countries. Maoists in the U.S. and around the world have also shied away from China's support for extreme right-wingers. The Maoists were particularly upset when the Chinese leadership acted as a left-wing cover for U.S. imperialism in Angola; the Chinese press did not mention the invasion of Angola by U.S.-backed South African troops for nine weeks, while there were daily articles blasting the invasion by Soviet-backed Cuban troops.

The Chinese leadership betrays the world revolutionary movement not only when it allies with U.S. imperialism, but also when it supports "progressive" national bourgeoisies instead of supporting revolutionaries. Communist "foreign policy" is working-class internationalism: support for socialist revolution around the world.

Shanghai a revolutionary hotbed

Shanghai in 1966 was seething with rebellion. The workers of that city, perhaps the most politically conscious in the entire world, had lived under 17 years of socialism yet remained bitterly oppressed by what Mao cavalierly described as "the remnants of the old order." In the factories, a bonus system created enormous wage differences, generated a capitalist hierarchy of foremen and supervisors, and turned each worker into a competitor with his brother. In the words of a veteran worker at the Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant, where the left wing Lianse organization was very powerful, "When the bonus was very high, some people could double their wages, while the lower paid got nothing but the crumbs." Those not fortunate enough to have industrial work lived on welfare, or were assigned to faraway provinces and frontier construction projects. They were separated for years from their families, who remained behind in Shanghai. Apprentices, contract and temporary workers were struggling to break the yoke of slave wages and unbearable conditions. Housing shortages were a source of discord: "national capitalists" continued to reside in their old mansions while working class families went without proper accommodation. Students, too, were upset about the bourgeois content of their instruction, the perpetuation of capitalist "streaming" systems, and the admissions procedures that made universities a preserve of the offspring of party members and the wealthy.

It was this cauldron of revolt that Mao sought to cool down, though he had quarrels with his many opponents within the party and the army on just how to do it. Mao was one of the communist movement's most skilled centrists. Since the early 1920s, he had prided himself on his compromises with Kuomintang generals, notably Chaing Kai-shek, and a variety of reactionaries who he claimed could be manipulated within his united front. Mao realized by 1966 that Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were openly detested by the workers, and that "new democracy" needed some cosmetic changes in order to restore its credibility.

Municipal headquarters stormed

The Cultural Revolution hit Shanghai in the fall of 1966, after the arrival of Red Guard students from Peking and elsewhere. Red Guards loyal to Mao singled out Shanghai's mayor, Tsao Ti-chiu, as the "capitalist roader" responsible for the city's ills. The headquarters of the municipal government was stormed on at least one occasion, windows were broken, furniture smashed, and party officials beaten up. By the end of September the city had been virtually taken over by more than a million Red Guards from out of town, and unrest was beginning to spread to Shanghai's impatient workers.

The first open rebellion occurred in early November, when a meeting of 40,000 workers sent a series of demands to the mayor. The gathering lasted from 2 p.m. one afternoon until dawn the following day. Chang Chun-chiao, who was director of the Shanghai Party Committee propaganda department, played "good cop-bad cop" with the workers, offering them a friendly ear when the mayor refused.

His attempts to defuse the rebellion failed, for it had reached its "critical mass." More and more revolutionary proletarian groups were being formed, with names like "Second Army Corps of Shanghai Workers," "Headquarters of the Revolutionary Revolt of Shanghai Workers," "Red Power Defense Army," and "Third Headquarters." Most of these groups — except the most loyally Maoist — have since been slandered as "rightist" or "conservative", but based on their activities there can be no doubt that the majority were far to the left of Mao and Co., and that they were predominantly made up of hundreds of thousands of militant, angry, pro-communist workers.

As the Cultural Revolution spread to the factories — something Mao had previously opposed — the Chairman laid down his "rules". These included an insistence on maintaining the eight hour day "firmly", they prohibited "departure of large delegations from factories or mines," and they affirmed "the principle of appealing to higher authorities."

Mao not heeded

Despite Mao's interference, by Christmas the entire city had risen in revolt. According to **Wen hui pao**, the rebellion "swept over the whole city and quickly spread to the rural areas with temporary crushing success." Strikes spread throughout the harbour, and completely shut down all maritime traffic. Textile mills and railroads followed suit. The two main rail lines linking Hangchow and Nanking were blocked, and any attempts to restore service were immediately stopped by strikers. The inland waterway system was closed down. Electricity and water supplies were disrupted. Factories were occupied, and the managers and capitalists were chased out. By the end of 1966 Shanghai was in the throes of a General Strike.

Students sit-in

Starting December 27, a student sit-in at the junction of the Tibet and Nanking roads, a main Shanghai intersection, completely blocked traffic for seven days. Among the issues was the students' hatred of the system of sending them to the countryside after graduation.

The invasion of Shanghai's "better neighbourhoods" began. "National capitalists", who had not only survived but prospered under Mao's system of "new democracy", were chased from their fancy homes and replaced by squatters.

By early January many of the most hated politicians, factory managers and party officials found themselves hauled before "peoples' courts" and confronted with their crimes. One bourgeois journalist, Neale Hunter, witnessed such a trial: "I found it depressing. No attorneys, no constitutional rights, no judge, no body of law, no court of appeal. It was justice of emotion. In retrospect, I probably was closer to unadulterated democracy than I will ever be again."

This "unadulterated democracy" was nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat. At this decisive point in early January 1967, Mao and his gang dropped

their centrist subtlety of playing along with the revolt and moved to crush it. His first gambit was to attack the strikes as "economist" and start calling for a return to work.

On January 11 the Peking government ordered everyone to "make the revolution and assist production." An order from Mao stated: "All public buildings and apartments belonging to national capitalists should be cleared within a week, and those who occupied them by force should go home."

"All power to the Commune"

As the month of January wore on, the slogan "All Power to the Commune" started to appear on the walls of Shanghai. Mao himself had originally raised the idea, back in the spring of 1966, that "commune-type" states should be the pattern for China. But he was obviously regretting his words. Mao had intended to set up a new state, different in form but essentially similar in content, replacing his own enemies with loyal aides, and making it appear to the workers that a more profound change had taken place. But the Commune had captured the imagination of the workers of Shanghai and other cities. One document that has been published outside China, "Whither China", by the Sheng-wu-lien Red Guard group, describes the commune as a genuine socialist formation, a break with the new democratic type state set up by the revolution of 1949. Among the Commune's key features was democratic election of state officials at all levels, removal of preferential salaries for officials and party cadres, an end to the standing army which had become a tool of the Maoists for their own ends, and immediate recall of officials who had failed to work in the interests of the proletariat. It was modelled on the Paris Commune of 1871, of which Engels said: "do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

On Jan. 28 a revolutionary committee was formed in Taiyuan which passed the following resolution: "We firmly believe that in the not too distant future a completely new form of political organization based on our richly developed experience of the Paris Commune and **more in keeping with the socialist economic base**, namely, the Taiyuan Commune, will appear." (my emphasis). Less than a week later a printed leaflet was distributed on the streets of Peking announcing the imminent formation of a Peking People's Commune based on the Paris model.

On Feb. 6 a mass rally attended by more than 1,000,000 workers proclaimed the formation of the Shanghai Commune. That day's issue of **Wen pui pao** described the event: "It has destroyed the dictatorship of the old state, dominated by counter-revolutionary revisionists. Its organizational principal is democratic centralism as defined by Chairman Mao. Its aim is to safeguard the broadest democracy and exercise the harshest dictatorship against its enemies. Its directing members are elected by the revolutionary masses according to the principles of the Paris Conmune . . ."

Chou, Mao attack Commune

The Shanghai Commune was followed by the proclamation of a Peking Commune on Feb. 13, and a

WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE!

Harbin People's Commune on Feb. 16. But the enthusiasm of the workers for this new, revolutionary system "more in keeping with the socialist economic base" was not echoed in the central government. Instead Chou En-lai, and then Mao himself, started attacking the idea. In place of communes, they promoted "municipal revolutionary committees", which were also set up in certain provinces during the January rebellions. Unlike the Commune, these committees did not stand on democratic election; instead they entrenched the concept of a formal "three way alliance" between party cadres, the army and revolutionary workers. The Commune was dominated by the revolutionary working class leaders who had come to the fore in the strike wave, and it relegated the old party cadres to a sideline role. But the "revolutionary committees" practically excluded the new revolutionaries and merely replaced the old Liu Shao-chi crowd with Mao's hand picked supporters. Where this was impossible, the army often intervened directly. Mao justified this on Feb. 9: "It is not good to rely only on the Red Guards and workers after seizing power. Good leaders must be included in the new leadership organ without fail."

Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan were summoned to Peking following the declaration of the Shanghai Commune, and they met with Mao on Feb. 20. According to their reports of the meeting, he explained to them that the Commune was "premature". First he trotted out the pathetic excuse that it would necessitate changing the country's name to "People's Communes of China", and that this might jeopardize the country's diplomatic relations. But he went on to spell out his more basic objections: the rest of the country was not ready for such a move, and even in Shanghai the commune had resulted in a veritable revolution against leading cadres and specialists, who, he explained, were very much needed. Chang and Yao returned to Shanghai, blessed by the Chairman, and declared the formation of the "Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee". It was made up, according to the Maoist formula, of a "three in one" combination. Mao had left only one reservation: the name "commune" could be preserved if its removal would "undermine the enthusiasm of the people of Shanghai or jeopardize the general situation." In other words, if denunciation of the Commune would totally destroy the credibility of Mao, Chang and Yao, they could tolerate the name temporarily until the situation cooled down.

Rebels fight Commune dissolution

After the Commune was dissolved, the Maoist leaders of the Revolutionary Committee issued the following directive: "We ask the revolutionary masses and the soldiers to say nothing, to do nothing, not to call meetings, and not to put up posters against the creation of the great proletarian alliance." But

Yao and Chang did not take over without a fight. One rebel group staged an assault on the Revolutionary Committee's economic department, known officially as "The Grasp Revolution and Stimulate Production Work Team." Shanghai Radio later described the episode: members of the rebel group "detained and assaulted 28 members of the 'Grasp Revolution and Stimulate Production Work Team" of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee. After this incident they continued to deploy large numbers around the Shanghai Mansions day and night, beating up public security personnel, stirring up fights, and calling in large numbers of their counterparts from Kiangsu, Anhwei and other provinces to undermine the task of grasping revolution and stimulating production . . . They have openly attacked and resisted the Urgent Notice, slandering it as harmful to the workers, and have **denied the great achievements of the past 17 years by saying that the living conditions of the workers are now as poor as they were under the Kuomintang before liberation . . .**" (my emphasis)

The report was followed by this sharp admonition: "We warn you. You have gone too far. If you don't stop at the verge of the precipice, you will be sorry in the end." Similar "appeals" continued throughout the summer of 1967. The rebellion reemerged on numerous occasions during 1967 and 1968 before the Maoist regime was bold enough to severely repress, imprison and often execute those they termed "ultra Leftists."

The January storm and the declaration of the Shanghai Commune demonstrate in a nutshell the issues of the Cultural Revolution. There is no doubt about the widespread grievances existing in 1966 with scores of economic conditions and "vestiges of capitalism." Even Mao has never tried to deny this. What the revolutionary workers did was tie these "vestiges of capitalism" to the capitalists themselves, who had never been truly crushed by the Chinese revolution, but instead allowed to thrive on the fertilizer of Maoist theory. According to Mao in "On New Democracy," "the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as 'does not dominate the livelihood of the people' . . . A rich peasant economy will be allowed in the rural areas . . . In general socialist agriculture will not be established at this stage." Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-ping — in fact, the entire leadership of the Chinese Communist Party — was committed to this program. But within their ranks they quarrelled on its administration, just as Ed Broadbent, Pierre Trudeau, Joe Clark and Rene Levesque "quarrel" about how to inflict wage controls on the backs of Canada's workers.

Personality cult fatal

Why were the workers defeated in their fight to maintain the Commune? The vast majority failed to perceive Mao as a revisionist. In this regard, Mao's overwhelming cult of personality served to further protect him from attack. The Shanghai Commune was dissolved by Mao's decree in what was to become a typical pattern: revolutionaries went to the oracle in Peking, desirous of the divine blessing from the Chairman that could make or break an organization and a political line.

Nevertheless, the actions of the Shanghai workers in January 1967 (and they were merely the vanguard of a general revolutionary upheaval throughout China) stand as the first great rebellion against modern revisionism. The Shanghai proletariat was crying out for a revolutionary party that would do open battle with the revisionists in the old Chinese Communist Party. But most of all they were crying out for a revolutionary theory that explained the bankruptcy of "new democracy" and the united front with "progressive" or "national" capitalists.

Following the Cultural Revolution, Maoist accounts of the Paris Commune became more and more insipid. On its 100th anniversary, in 1971, the Paris Commune was portrayed in a dry, lifeless manner without significance to modern China. Like the Soviet revisionists, the Chinese Communist Party has become expert in depicting great revolutionary events as sterile historical curiosities.

A footnote to the events is the recent demise of Chang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao. They were intricately tied up with the events of Shanghai in January 1967, so much so that they are known as the "Shanghai mafia." They played the role of sellouts: like Trotsky, Kautsky, Allende, and the leaders of today's revisionist Communist Parties, they took the side of the workers as a gambit to lead them into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Once they had served their purpose for the capitalists, they were themselves discarded.

The Shanghai Commune has been expurgated from all official Chinese accounts of the Cultural Revolution. Even at the time, there was no mention of it in external publications like the **Peking Review**. It should be a duty of all communists to revive the story of the Shanghai Commune, and its important lessons about the nature of modern revisionism.

Long live the Shanghai Commune!
Long live the Paris Commune!

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(See special supplement, pp. 11-12)

CHALLENGE

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'Trudeau Speaks with Forked Tongue'

CAR Attacks Canadian Bosses' Racism

TORONTO, CANADA—INCAR members unfurled their anti-racist banner last week in the middle of Prime Minister Trudeau's speech. The banner said, "Stop Racism—Kill Immigration Bill." The INCAR members began attacking the racist acts of Trudeau and the fascist-like immigration laws which give the government unprecedented powers to attack immigrant workers. Trudeau became so rattled that he asked one of the CAR members to come to the platform to speak. The hall was packed with 8,000 people, many of whom were immigrant workers. Trudeau believed that CAR members would cringe and back off. However, Professor Pete Rosenthal of Toronto University took advantage of Trudeau's offer and went right down to the stage. Rosenthal exposed Trudeau's record of attacking immigrant workers. At the meeting Trudeau was trying to cover his racist tracks by claiming that, in fact, he was anti-racist and a "friend of the immigrant." Rosenthal nailed this lie, and said, "Trudeau speaks with a FORKED TONGUE."

Trudeau's entire cabinet was at the meeting. They and the rest of their claque tried to boo Rosenthal down. Rosenthal stuck to his guns and unmasked Trudeau's racism. At the end of the five minutes alloted to him by Trudeau, Rosenthal's remarks were well received. The police tried to get Rosenthal out of the hall, claiming that they were trying to prevent the angry crowd from attacking Rosenthal. Rosenthal refused this sham help. Instead, hundreds of workers gathered around Rosenthal to compliment him and ask questions about INCAR. Over 100 people gave Rosenthal their names and addresses.

INCAR's efforts at this rally again prove the vitality of a mass anti-racist position put forward boldly and without frills. INCAR's future in Canada and the U.S. looks good.

International Women's Day

(See page 4)